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Urban and Lambert (2005, 2008) present an exhaustive summary and an in-depth discussion of the 
literature contributions about the decomposition of the redistributive effect of a tax (RE). The 
authors discuss the indexes available in the literature for the potential vertical effect (V), the loss due 
to horizontal fairness violations (H) and that due to re-rankings (R); they also introduce new indexes 
specifically conceived to take into account problems arising when groups of exact equals are 
substituted by groups of close equals. Close equals groups are generally obtained by splitting the 
pre-tax income distribution into contiguous intervals having the same bandwidth, so that the problem 
of the bandwidth choice arises. van de Van, Creedy and Lambert (2001) suggest choosing the 
bandwidth that maximizes the potential vertical effect V. Even looking for V maximization, we 
discuss a new criterion that yields a compromise between the contrasting needs of minimizing the 
effects of pre-tax within groups inequalities and the minimization of group average re-rankings. The 
criterion is then applied to evaluate the components of two decompositions: the former is the one 
suggested by Urban and Lambert (2005, 2008) as preferable, the latter is suggested by us on the 
basis of Urban and Lambert’s paving discussion. According to our simulation results, when 
comparing different income tax systems for a same population, the new criterion seems to introduce 
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 1.  Introduction 
Decomposing the income tax redistributive effect across groups of pre-tax equals, 
into potential vertical, horizontal and re-ranking effects has been intensively studied in 
recent years.  
The original work by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) considers exact pre-tax 
equals in portioning the pre-tax income distribution. However, in the real world exact 
equals are rare: in order to overcome the problem, the suggestion is splitting the pre-tax 
income distribution into contiguous groups. Income earners contained in a same income 
interval are considered as “close equals”. Then two problems arise: (i) the original 
decomposition of the redistributive effect has to be adapted to represent situations where 
exact equals groups are substituted by close equals groups and (ii) a proper constant 
bandwidth has to be chosen to create intervals. 
Urban and Lambert (2005, 2008) present an exhaustive summary and an in-depth 
discussion of the literature contributions about the decomposition of the redistributive 
effect of a tax system. The authors discuss the indexes available in the literature for the 
potential vertical effect, the loss due to horizontal fairness violations and that due to re-
rankings; they also introduce new indexes specifically conceived to take into account 
problems arising when groups of exact equals are substituted by groups of close equals. 
In this article we suggest a further decomposition, which uses the same vertical 
effect index suggested by Urban and Lambert, but differs both in the horizontal effect 
index and in the sources of re-ranking explicitly taken into account. 
van de Van, Creedy and Lambert (2001) suggest choosing the bandwidth that 
maximizes the potential vertical effect: we here propose a new criterion for the choice 
of the bandwidth. Without neglecting the importance of maximizing the potential 
vertical effect, this criterion takes into consideration two contrasting needs: (i) 
minimizing the effects of pre-tax within groups inequalities and (ii) limiting as much as 
possible group averages re-ranking between the post-tax and the-pre-tax income 
distributions. Both the criterion which maximizes the value of the vertical effect and our 
criterion lead to a specific bandwidth for any tax system. If we want to compare the 
effects of different tax reforms on a same population of taxpayers, this can be seen as a 
problem. If we decide to adopt the specific “optimal” bandwidth for each tax system,  
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the decompositions of the redistributive effect may not be fully comparable, as the 
elements depend on the bandwidth. However, under the hypothesis that the components 
of the redistributive effect are properly estimated by the bandwidth which is specifically 
optimal for each tax system, whenever a unique bandwidth is adopted, approximations 
errors are likely to be introduced. We give empirical evidence of the relative efficiency 
of the new criterion, testing different tax systems on two different gross income 
distributions. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present our decomposition of the 
redistributive effect; in section 3 we discuss our new criterion for the choice of the 
bandwidth; in section 4 we describe the simulations which test the efficiency of the new 
criterion, when different tax systems are analyzed by a unique bandwidth. Section 5 
contains concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  The decomposition of the redistributive effect 
Consider a given taxpayers population, with a pre-tax and a post-tax income 
distribution X and Y, respectively; let  X G  and  Y G  are the Gini indexes for the pre-tax 
and the post-tax income parade. As it is well known, the redistribution effect can be 
evaluated as  
XY REG G =− .                  ( 1 )  
By making use of Gini index decomposition properties, Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994), henceforth AJL, split the actual redistributive effect (1) into the 
potential vertical effect, the horizontal inequity and the re-ranking effects due to the 
taxes. 
In general, whenever the Gini coefficient is calculated for a population attribute Z, 
and population units can be gathered into groups, GZ decomposes into the sum of three 
non-negative components: the between group component 
B
Z G , the within group 
component 
W
Z G  and the overlapping component. The between group component 
B
Z G  is 
obtained by substituting all attribute values within each group by their group average.  
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Ga G =∑ , where  , kZ G  is the Gini 
coefficient for the k-th group,  , kZ a  is the product of the population share and the 
attribute share related to the k-th group. The overlapping component can be obtained as 
a difference by subtracting the sum ( )
BW
ZZ GG +  to GZ. 
AJL assume that income earners can be gathered into groups of subjects having the 
same pre-tax income: so, in the pre-tax income distribution, being all incomes within a 
group equal to one another, the within group and the overlapping components are equal 
to zero so that 
B
XX GG ≡ . 
Concerning the post-tax income distribution, AJL assume that group income 
averages maintain the same ranking they had before taxes, and admit that, in general, 
both the within group and the overlapping components are no longer necessarily equal 
to zero, so  Y G  assumes the general form 
BWA J L
YYY GGGR =++ , where, according to 
Urban and Lambert (2005, 2008) notation,  ( )
AJL B W
YY Y R GG G =− + . 
Under these assumptions, AJL can write the redistribution effect as  
()
BW A J L
XY XY Y REG G G G G R =−= − −− ,            ( 2 )  
and define  ()
B
XY VGG =− as the potential vertical effect, 
W
Y HG =  as the horizontal 
(inequity) effect and 
AJL R  as the re-ranking effect: actually H measures how much those 
who were equal before taxes have become no longer equal after taxes and 
AJL R  
coincides with the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani re-ranking index 
APK R . Given the above 
enlisted hypotheses, the concentration index for post-tax incomes, aligned according to 
the pre-tax non-decreasing order, is  ( )
BW
YY Y DG G =+, so that 
APK
YY R GD =− coincides 
with 
AJL R . 
However, exact equals groups are in general quite rare, so that the suggestion is to 
select “close equals groups” (henceforth CEG) by splitting the pre-tax income range 
into contiguous income intervals having the same bandwidth: close equals are then 
income earners who have their incomes falling in a same interval. We observe that the 
bandwidth has to be large enough to gather some incomes and small enough to include 
nearly equal incomes. Dealing with CEG, 
W
X G  is now generally different from zero,  
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being a direct function of the adopted bandwidth; the after tax overlapping component, 
()
BW
XX X GG G −+, is still equal to zero by construction, as in the pre-tax income 
distribution groups are contiguous and, then, without intersections. 
Moreover, as taxes may alter also the within group ranking and the group averages 
ranking, the situation may be more complex than that described by equation (2). 
When CEG are considered, an immediate generalization of (2) is given by van de 
Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001), who suggest the following RE decomposition 
() ( )
B B W W AJL VCL VCL AJL
XY XY Y X REG G G G G G R V H R = − =− −−−=−−.    (3) 
In (3), the potential vertical effect and the horizontal effect are measured by 
()
VCL B B
XY VG G =− and  ()
VCL W W
YX HG G =−, respectively. 
In coherence with the principle of CEG, Urban and Lambert (2005, 2008) introduce 
the idea of smoothing taxes within groups and give a further definition for the vertical 
and the horizontal effects. If groups contain close equals, their incomes should be taxed 
by the same tax rate, which can be properly estimated by the group average tax rate. 
Having applied a same tax rate to all incomes in group k, the Gini index for group k 
remains exactly equal to the pre-tax one  , kX G ; however the smoothed within groups 
Gini coefficient  ,,
SW
Yk Y k X
k
Ga G =∑  is generally different from  ,,
W
Xk X k X
k
Ga G =∑ , 
because  ,, kX kY aa ≠ . The authors define the potential vertical effect 
()
AJL B SW
XY Y VG G G =− +  and the horizontal effect 
AJL W SW
YY HG G =−, so that they can 
decompose RE as  
() ( )
B SW W SW AJL AJL AJL AJL
XYY Y Y REGGG GG R V H R = − −− −− = −− .   (4) 
We remark the significant difference between 
VCL H  and 
AJL H : 
VCL H  applies different 
weights to the pre-tax and post tax Gini coefficient of a same group, being 
() ,, , ,
VCL
kY kY kX kX
k
Ha G a G =− ∑ ; conversely, 





Ha G G =− ∑ , so that H
AJL reflects only (weighed) variations of group 
Gini indexes, while H
VCL depends not only on these variations, but also on differences 
from pre-tax and post-tax weights. As a consequence, H
AJL cannot be positive if all  
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,, kX kY GG ≥ , whereas the sign of H
VCL depends also on the combined effect due to ak,Y 
and ak,X. Empirical evidence shows that V
VCL dominates V
AJL and that V
VCL can be still 
increasing when V
AJL has already started decreasing
1.  
Whenever re-rankings occur among group averages and within group incomes, R
AJL 
considered in (3) and (4) is only a part of the APK re-ranking index
2: then, in general, as 
Urban and Lambert observe, R
APK can be more generally split into three components 
APK AJL B W R RR R =+ + ,              ( 5 )  
having defined  ()
B BB
YY R GD =− and  ( )
WW W
YY RG D =−, where 
B
Y D  and 
W
Y D  are the 
between and within group concentration coefficients for post-tax income parade, 
respectively
3. 
Urban and Lambert observe that both (3) and (4) do not specify between and within 
groups re-rankings; for this reason they correct the potential vertical measure V
AJL and 
the horizontal effect H
AJL: they add the component R
B to V
AJL and subtract R
W from H
AJL 
obtaining the following decomposition for RE  
() ( )
B SW W SW APK UL UL APK
XYY Y Y RE G D G D G R V H R =− − −− − =−− .      ( 6 )  
In (6) the vertical effect and the horizontal effect are now expressed by 
()
UL B SW AJL B
XY Y VGD G V R =− + = +  and 
UL W SW AJL W
YY HD GHR =− = − , respectively; 
note that V
UL can be read as the between groups “full” vertical effect, ( )
BB
XY GD − , 
corrected by 
SW W
YX GG − . 
The index V
UL has the advantage of being part of a decomposition containing all re-
ranking components, and not only R
AJL; however, as observed in Urban and Lambert 
(2005, 2008), H
UL turns to be negative very soon, even for very small bandwidths. For 
this reason the authors suggest evaluating a positive version of this index (we label it 
H
UL+): by ordering income series according to their pre-tax order, H
UL+ is calculated 
                                                 
1 This is documented by empirical evidence in Urban and Lambert (2008), Mazurek (2009) and Mussini and Zavanella (2009). 
2 We evaluate these violations using both the Bank of Italy survey of households income and wealth and the Wroclaw Municipality 
tax payers data set. 
3 
B
Y D  is defined as the concentration index when all incomes inside each group are substituted by the group income average and, 
moreover, groups are ranked according to pre-tax group averages.  ,,
W
Yk Y k Y
k
Da D =∑ , where  , kY D  is the concentration index for 
the k-th group, when after tax incomes are ranked according to their pre-tax ranking, and  , kY a  is the product of the k-th group 
population share and post-tax income share.  
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considering as positive the areas defined between the concentration curve of post-tax 
incomes and that of smoothed post-tax incomes; which can cross many times. 
Unluckily, in general, H
UL+ does not verify decomposition (6). 
We want to remark that the main problem in the decompositions (3) and (4) is not 
that R
AJL is just one of the three components of R
APK. The real problem is that, as 
Vernizzi, Monti and Mussini (2010) point out, when group average re-ranking occurs, 
R
AJL cannot be considered at all as a re-ranking measure. In this case, R
AJL simply 
indicates the presence of income earners that have not permuted their after tax positions 
with respect to their initial pre-tax positions. The index R
APK can be more properly 
decomposed as the sum of two re-ranking measures: the measure of within groups re-
ranking  R
W and the measure of the across groups re-ranking, that is the re-ranking 
concerning incomes belonging to different groups, R
AG. This last measure may well be 
decomposed as 
AG B AJL R RR =+ , but both 
B R  and 
AJL R  cannot be so clearly 
interpreted. 
On the basis of these considerations, we think that we should surely avoid 
decompositions of the redistributive effect where the term 
AJL R  appears by itself. 




W from the overall re-ranking term. Supposing that within group pre-tax 
incomes are all different, but differences are so slight which could be due to random 
measurement errors, even if the post-tax ranking noticeably differs from the pre-tax one 
either in the numbers of permutations or in their intensities, with an index R
W probably 
relatively quite high, likely it would be improper evaluating this as a case of re-ranking. 
In our opinion it would be better considered just as a case where the post-tax income 
inequality becomes greater than the pre-tax one. If we accept this consideration, the re-
ranking index could be more properly measured by R
AG instead than by R
APK. 
Considering the horizontal effect, H
AJL can be a more direct and a bit less biased 
measure than H
UL+, being the former a weighed sum of differences between the post-tax 
and the pre-tax Gini indexes of each group.  
Then we suggest the following decomposition: 
UL AJL AG REV H R =− −.                ( 7 )   
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If we now compare expression (7) with expression (6), we observe that in (7) the re-
ranking index no longer includes R
W, being  ( )
AG AJL B R RR =+ ; moreover the horizontal 
effect is measured by H
AJL as it was in decomposition (4). 
In conclusion, we think that if CEG are close enough, which is more likely to 
happen when the groups are small, (7) can well be considered either an alternative or a 
complement to (6)
4. 
Nevertheless, the vertical and the horizontal effect in (6) and (7) depend on 
bandwidth. Then, the real problem is rather to individuate a convenient bandwidth in 
order to properly evaluate V’s, H’s and, in case, R
APK components. The next sections try 
to contribute to the solution of this problem. 
3.  The “optimal” bandwidth 
In the CEG approach there is the problem of determining the bandwidth by which 
the pre-tax income distribution has to be split into contiguous groups of income. 
Starting from van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) it is commonly accepted to 
choose the bandwidth where V or ( ) VR E is maximum. In their seminal paper, AJL 
hypothesize that (i) exact equals groups could be identified and that (ii) no re-ranking 
occurred for post-tax group averages; we suggest a criterion that chooses a bandwidth 
that not only draws out as much as possible of the vertical effect, but that also tries to 
minimize the effects due to within groups inequalities and group averages re-rankings. 
If hypotheses (i) and (ii) are verified, being 
W
X G  and R
B equal to zero, expression (3) 
coincides with the original AJL’s decomposition (2) and, in particular, 
VCL B B
XY VG G =− 
correctly measures the vertical effect as originally defined by AJL. If we write V
UL as 
()
UL VCL SW W B
YX VV GGR =− −+ ,              ( 8 )  
we see that V
UL can be obtained from to V
VCL by subtracting ( )
SW W
YX GG −  and by adding 
R
B. The addition of R
B makes V
VCL, the between groups vertical effect, to be substituted 
                                                 
4 Also H
AJL becomes negative,  when bandwidths are rather large: in Urban and Lambert (2008) for bandwidths larger than 40,000 





XY GD − , which is the between groups “full” vertical effect; ( )
SW W
YX GG −  corrects 
for the within groups Gini index variation, which depends on pre-tax within groups 
inequalities. 
Observe that the within groups Gini index variation ( )
WW
YX GG − , can be expressed 
as  
() ( ) ,, , , , ,
WW
Y X kY kY kX kY kX kX
kk
GG aG G a a G
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
−= − + − ⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑ ,         ( 9 )  




aG G H −= ∑  and  ( ) ( ) ,, ,
SW W
kY kX kX Y X
k
aaG GG −⋅= − ∑ . Given the 
pre-tax and post-tax system of weights, while the former component, H
AJL, depends on 
groups inequality modifications, the latter, ( )
SW W
YX GG − , depends on pre-tax within 
groups inequalities.  
Even if V
UL is conceived in order to keep into account violations of (i) and (ii), by 
the corrections yielded through the components R
B and ( )
SW W
YX GG − , we think it would 
be better choosing a bandwidth which needs these corrections as small as possible. We 




YX GG − , and the maximisation of V
UL. In order to yield this target, we adopt the 
criterion 











.              ( 1 0 )  
Expression (10) considers the absolute value for ( )
SW W
YX GG − ; this is probably an 




,, , , 2 1
VCL AJL SW W kk k
Y X kY kX kX kX
kk
nt t





−=− = −⋅= ⋅
− ∑∑ ,   (11) 
where  µk is the average of pre-tax incomes, nk the number of (equivalent) income 
earners, tk the average tax rate for group k, µ the overall average of pre-tax incomes, n 
the total number of (equivalent) income earners and t  the overall tax rate, respectively. 
Being income distributions generally skew, groups presenting a positive difference for  
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() k tt −  belong to the left tail of the distribution and are more crowded than those 
which belong to the right tail; as a consequence, 
SW W
YX GG −  is expected to be non-
negative, which explains why  0
VCL AJL VV − ≥  (and, consequently,  0
VCL AJL HH −≥ )
5. 
We observe that  R
B and ( )
SW W
YX GG −  show a contrasting behaviour: R
B appears to 
be a decreasing function with respect to the bandwidth, while ( )
SW W
YX GG −  increases 
with the bandwidth, at least as long as the bandwidth does not become very large; then 
in the limit both components are zero when the bandwidth coincides with the income 
range. In any case, when ( )
SW W
YX GG −  starts decreasing, V
UL appears to be already much 
lower than RE
6. 
The behavior of (10) is represented in Figure 1 and 2: for smaller bandwidths, the 
numerator of (10) coincides with 
B R ; then, after the minimum, it becomes equal to 
( )
SW W
YX GG − . Empirical evidence shows that (10) presents an asymmetric U-shaped 
form, with its minimum in a neighbourhood of the bandwidth where 
B R  and 
SW W
YX GG −  
lines cross
7. 
Both the criterion which maximizes the value of the vertical effect and the criterion 
(10) lead to a specific bandwidth for any tax system. However if we want to analyze the 
effects of different tax reforms on a same population of taxpayers, we should adopt a 
unique bandwidth in order to have fully comparable estimates for the components of the 
redistributive effect.  
In the next section, by using different microsimulation models, we test the 
efficiency of criterion (10) with respect to the maximization of either V
UL or V
AJL, when 
one bandwidth has to be adopted. We will consider the components entering 
decomposition (6) and (7), which depend on the bandwidth.  
                                                 
5 Urban and Lambert (2005, 2008), Vernizzi and Pellegrino (2008), Mazurek (2009), Mussini and Zavanella (2009). 
6 Mussini and Zavanella (2009) and Mazurek (2009) show that 
SW W
YX GG −  starts to decrease when the bandwidth is really large: 
larger than 50.000/100.000 Pl zl in Mazurek’s empirical analysis, and larger than 50.000 € in Mussini and Zavanella’s one. 
7 We again refer to Mussini and Zavanella (2009) and Mazurek (2009) for an extensive empirical analysis of the behaviour of (10) 
as bandwidth enlarges. Even if the authors consider a ratio that is different from (10), the author’s ratio and the ratio at expression 
(10) converge as V
UL and V
AJL converge.   
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4.  The efficiency of the new criterion when comparing 
different tax systems  
When the effects of tax reforms are to be analyzed, one needs to apply a same 
bandwidth in order to be able to compare indexes that are functions of the bandwidth. 
This need however contradicts the adoption of a criterion which would identify a proper 
bandwidth for each tax system. In fact, if one assumes that the “true” indexes are those 
calculated in correspondence of the optimal bandwidth, indexes calculated in 
correspondence of bandwidths different than the optimal one are only approximations of 
the “true” ones. Then a criterion should be evaluated also under the aspect of its 
efficiency in containing the approximation errors which arise when a unique bandwidth 
has to be adopted for different tax-systems. 
In this section we will compare the behavior of criterion (10) with that of the 
criterion that maximizes the vertical effect, when different tax systems are considered. 




AG that enter 
decompositions (6) and (7). The maximization criterion is applied both to V
AJL and V
UL; 
the maximization of V
VCL is not taken into consideration: as it appears in Urban and 
Lambert (2005, 2008), Mazurek (2009) and in Mussini and Zavanella (2009), the 
maximum for V
VCL is reached for quite large bandwidths, so that income groups can 
hardly be considered as CEG. In what follows, we indicate the minimization of the ratio 
given at (10) by mr, the maximization of V
AJL by MAJL and the maximization of V
UL by 
MUL. 
The comparisons are performed by simulations based on gross income 
distributions concerning both Italy and the Municipality of Wrocław (Poland). The 
gross income distribution for Italy is obtained through a micro-simulation model based 
on the 2006 Bank of Italy Survey on household income and wealth (Pellegrino et al, 
2010), while that for the Municipality of Wrocław is a 2001 data set kindly made 
available by Lower-Silesian tax offices. We decided to perform the simulations on the 
bases of these two data-sets, due to the different characteristics they present: the Polish  
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pre-tax income distribution presents greater inequality indexes, a stronger right 
skewness and a heavier right tail than the Italian one.
8  
A set of different tax systems (see appendix for details) are applied to gross 
incomes: ten for the Italian data set and sixteen for the Polish one; the Italian set and the 
Polish one are considered separately. 
For each criterion c  () ,, c MUL MAJL mr = , we can obtain a set of N bandwidths, 
12 , ,..., ,...,
c ccc
iN b bbb ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  each being “optimal” for one of the N tax systems. We indicate by 
( ) |
c
i bs θ  the value assumed by the RE component θ in tax system s at bandwidth 
c
i b ; in 
particular  ( ) |
c
s bs θ  indicates the value assumed by θ at the bandwidth 
c
s b  that criterion c 
gives as “optimal” for tax-system s. 
In the first experiment we assume that, given the criterion c ( ) ,, c MUL MAJL mr = , 
( ) |
c
s bs θ , evaluated at the “optimal” bandwidth 
c
s b , is the “true” value of θ, and that the 
other  () 1 N −   ( ) |
c
i bs θ  are just estimates of  ( ) |
c
s bs θ . The efficiency of criterion c can 
then be evaluated by the root mean square error of the estimates with respect to the 














⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ ∑ ,           ( 1 2 )  
{ } |
c RMS s θ  can be calculated for each tax system s. 
The relative efficiency of mr criterion with respect to MUL and MAJL is then 
defined, respectively, as 
{ } { } ||
MUL MUL mr
mr eR M S s R M S s θθ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦            ( 1 3 )  
{ } { } ||
MAJL MAJL mr
mr eR M S s R M S s θθ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦            ( 1 4 )  
According to expression (13) and (14), mr is more efficient than MUL and MAJL, 
whenever 
MUL
mr e  and 
MAJL
mr e  are greater than 1. 
                                                 
8 For pre-tax income distribution of the Bank of Italy data-set, the summary statistics are: GX = 0.438, Coefficient of Variation = 
1.18, Skewness = 9.85, Kurtosis = 197.24. Even if we do not take into account the extreme pre-tax incomes, which are appear in the 
right tail of the Polish distribution, for the Municipality of Wrocław the correspondent statistics are: GX = 0.483, Coefficient of 
Variation = 2.79, Skewness = 97.54, Kurtosis = 13,482.55.  
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Table 3 and 4 summarize the behaviour of (13) and (14) for the Italian and Polish 
distributions, respectively. 
In the second experiment we assume that “true” values are just those obtained at the 
bandwidth that maximizes either V
AJL or V
UL. In this experiment criterion (10) is then 
considered just an instrument to obtain estimates for the true values and it is deliberately 
disadvantaged with respect to the maximizing criterion, to better evaluate its 
potentialities.  
Then, for what concerns criterions MAJL and MUL, they continue in being 
evaluated by  { } |
c RMS s θ  defined at (12), conversely, in what concerns mr, we now use  













⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ ∑          ( 1 5 )  
being c = MUL, MAJL. 
The efficiency of mr criterion, with respect to MUL and MAJL, is now given by the 
ratios 
{ } { } | || ,
MUL MUL mr
mr MUL eR M S s R M S s M U L θθ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦          ( 1 6 )  
 
{ } { } | || ,
MAJL MAJL mr
mr MAJL eR M S s R M S s M A J L θθ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ .           ( 1 7 )  
 
Again, according to (16) and (17), mr is more efficient than MUL and MAJL, 
whenever  |
MUL
mr MUL e  and  |
MAJL
mr MAJL e , respectively, are greater than 1. 
Table 5 summarizes the behaviour of (16) and (17) for the Italian simulated tax 
systems and Table 6 summarizes the results obtained by the simulations performed 
using the Polish data base. 
As we can see from Tables 3 and 4, in the first experiment where the three 
criterions are compared on a same basis, mr, the criterion given by the minimization of 
ratio (10), results everywhere to be more efficient than the criterion of maximization 
both of V
AJL and V
UL, being (13) and (14) always greater than 1 and in most cases 
(always in Table 3) even greater than 2. 
In the second experiment, where mr is just an instrument to get estimates for the 
true values and then it “competes with a handicap” with respect to MUL and MAJL, as 
we can see, from Tables 5 and 6, mr no longer dominates MUL and MAJL everywhere.  
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However, even in the second experiment, in general, mr remains preferable to MUL 
and MAJL. The geometric averages of (16) and (17) are everywhere greater than 1. 
Moreover, we not only observe that the cases where (16) and (17) are greater than 2 are 
many more than those where they are lower than 1, but we can also observe that the 
maximum gains attained by mr are much greater than the maximum losses: (16) and 
(17) can reach quite high values and they are never lower than 0.71.
9 
We can conclude the criterion suggested in this paper can be considered an 
improvement in choosing bandwidth that has to be robust with respect to changes in 
post-tax income distributions, as it is the case when comparing of a sequence of tax 
reforms, concerning a same population of tax payers. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
On the basis of Urban and Lambert’s (2005, 2008) paving discussion, in this article 
we have introduced a further decomposition of the redistributive effect RE and we have 
suggested a new criterion for the bandwidth choice. We have then evaluated the relative 
efficiency of the new criterion in minimizing the mean square of the approximation 
errors, which arise when comparing different tax systems for a same population by a 
unique bandwidth, instead of the one optimal the maximization of the potential vertical 
effect has been taken as benchmark. 
Our decomposition, presented in section 2, uses the same index suggested by Urban 
and Lambert to measure the potential vertical effect; however, (i) it measures the 
horizontal effect by the weighed sum of within groups Gini index variations (the H
AJL 
index, according to Urban and Lambert’s notation) and (ii) the re-ranking effect 
considers only across groups re-rankings, which is measured by adding the between 
groups re-ranking index to the after tax overlapping index (the R
AJL index, according to 
Urban and Lambert’s notation), or by subtracting the within groups re-ranking index R
W 
from the Aronson-Plotnick-Kakwani re-ranking index. 
                                                 
9 The relative efficiency of the new criterion can depend on the different extent of regularity that the curves of 
{ } () max ;
SW W B UL
YX GG R V − , V
AJL and V
UL present (Figures 1-6). Mazurek (2009) analyzes the curves V
AJL and V
UL for the Polish 
data set, together with that of a ratio which behaves very close to the one in criterion (10): she measures how the ratio is actually 
much more regular around its minimum, than both V’s  are around their maxima.  
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We think that when close equals groups inequalities are particularly slight, this 
decomposition can be used in alternative or in addition to Urban and Lambert’s. 
The second contribution of this paper concerns the choice of the so called optimal 
bandwidth. Starting from van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) it is commonly 
accepted to choose the bandwidth where the potential vertical effect is maximized. With 
the aim of preserving as much as possible the original framework conceived by 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), we have introduced a criterion that, without 
neglecting the importance of maximizing the potential vertical effect, becomes a 
compromise of two different and contrasting needs, if taken together: (i) the 
minimization of the within groups Gini index variation that depends on pre-tax within 
groups inequalities, (ii) the minimization of group average re-ranking. 
In section 4 we consider the problem that arises when the effects of different tax 
systems on a same population are to be analyzed and, consequently, one needs to apply 
a same bandwidth, in order to have indexes that can be comparable. This need however 
contradicts the adoption of a criterion which would identify a proper bandwidth for each 
tax system. If one assumes that the “true” indexes are those calculated in 
correspondence of the optimal bandwidth, the indexes calculated in correspondence of 
bandwidths different than the optimal one are only approximations of the “true” ones.  
By microsimulations performed using both the Bank of Italy Survey on household 
income and wealth and the data set of tax payers in the Municipality of Wrocław 
(Poland), we have shown that the (root) mean square errors of the approximations are 
always lower, and often much lower, when the indexes are calculated in correspondence 
of bandwidths identified by the new criterion, than by the criterion which maximizes the 
potential vertical effect. Moreover, the bandwidths identified by the new criterion give 
better approximation in average even when we assume that the true indexes are those 






Aronson R. J., Johnson P. J., Lambert P. J., (1994), “Redistributive effect and unequal income tax 
treatment”, The Economic Journal, 104, pp. 262-270. 
Mazurek, E. (2009), “A note on the identification of the bandwidth for the potential redistribution index 
evaluation”, Pragmata Tes Oikonomias  (ed: M. Kulesza, W. Ostasiewicz), Jan Dlugosz University, 
Czestochowa, 3, pp. 247-251 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1469574). 
Mussini, M., Zavanella, B. (2009), “Choosing the bandwidth for decomposing the redistributive effect: 
evidence from Milan using AMeRIcA data”, Pragmata Tes Oikonomias, (ed: M. Kulesza, W. 
Ostasiewicz), Jan Dlugosz University, Czestochowa, 3, pp. 253-273 (available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1445463). 
Pellegrino S., Piacenza M., Turati G. (2010), Developing a static microsimulation model for the analysis 
of housing taxation in Italy, Department of Economics and Public Finance, University of Torino, 
mimeo. 
Urban I., Lambert P. J. (2005), “Redistribution, horizontal inequity and re-ranking: how to measure them 
properly”, University of Oregon Economics Discussion Paper, 2005-12. Eugene, OR: University of 
Oregon. 
Urban I., Lambert P. J. (2008), “Redistribution, horizontal inequity and re-ranking: how to measure them 
properly”, Public Finance Review, 30, n. 5, pp. 563-587. 
van de Ven J., Creedy J., Lambert P. J., (2001), “Close equals and calculation of the vertical, horizontal 
and re-ranking effects of taxation”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 63, pp. 381-394. 
Vernizzi, A., Pellegrino, S. (2008), On determining “close equals groups” in decomposing redistributive 
and re-ranking effects, SIEP, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica, WP 602/08. 
Vernizzi A., M.G. Monti, M. Mussini (2010), “A Gini and Concentration Index Decomposition with an 
Application to the APK re-ranking Measure”, S.I.S. Conference Proceedings, Padua.  
 
16
Table 1: Summary of index definitions 
CEG  CEG (close equals groups) are constituted by subjects belonging to a same pre-tax income 
bracket; income brackets are created by splitting the pre-tax non decreasing incomes parade 
into contiguous intervals characterized by a same income bandwidth. Groups contain the 
same subjects both before and after taxes, whatever ordering criterion is adopted. Before 
taxes no overlapping exists by construction; taxation may result in group overlapping.  
X G   Gini index for pre-tax income parade.  
B
X G   between groups Gini index for pre-tax income parade: it is defined as the Gini index when 
all incomes inside each group are substituted by the group income average.  
W
X G   within groups Gini index for pre-tax income parade:   ,,
W
Xk X k X
k
Ga G =∑ , where  , kX G  is 
the Gini index for the k-th group and  , kX a  is the product of the k-th group  population share 
and pre-tax income share. 
Y G   Gini index for post-tax income parade. 
B
Y G   it is analogous to 
B
X G  for the post-tax income parade. 
W
Y G   within groups Gini index for post-tax income parade:   ,,
W
Yk Y k Y
k
Ga G =∑ , where  , kY G  is the 
post-tax Gini index for the k-th group and  , kY a  is the product of the k-th group population 
share and post-tax income share. 
Y D   concentration index for post-tax income parade when ordered according to the pre-tax order. 
B
Y D   between groups concentration index for post-tax income parade: it is defined as the 
concentration index when all incomes inside each group are substituted by the group income 
average, moreover groups are ordered according to pre-tax group averages. 
W
Y D   within groups concentration index for post-tax income parade:   ,,
W
Yk Y k Y
k
Da D =∑ ; , kY D  is 
the concentration index for the k-th group, when the k-th group incomes are ordered 
according to the pretax within group order, and  , kY a  is the product of the k-th group 
population share and post-tax income share. 
SW
Y G   within groups Gini index for post-tax smoothed income parade. The smoothed income 
parade is obtained by applying the group average tax rate to all incomes which belong to the 
same group.  ,,
SW
Yk Y k X
k
Ga G =∑ , as the Gini index for the k-th group remains unchanged, 




Table 2: Summary of equations and components 
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Table 3: Efficiency of mr criterion in the Italian simulated tax systems: each 
criterion provides its own “true” indexes  
  V





mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
MUL
mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
MUL
mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
MUL
mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
Max  42.69 42.47 40.31 39.62  8.49  9.82 12.17  9.95 
min  2.79 2.74 4.53 4.06 3.34 2.40 3.80 3.18 
geometric mean  19.63 19.55 24.26 23.41  5.71  4.65  6.65  5.07 
n. of cases>2  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
n. of cases 1÷2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n. of cases 0.5÷1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n. of cases ≤ 0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4: Efficiency of mr criterion in the Polish simulated tax systems: each 
criterion provides its own “true” indexes 
  V





mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
MUL
mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
MUL
mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
MUL
mr e  
MAJL
mr e  
Max  90.07 89.56 83.43 81.89 54.81 55.88  8.98  5.92 
min  1.96 2.66 4.14 2.59 2.31 1.50 1.66 1.03 
geometric mean  29.94 31.08 28.82 25.76  5.73  4.19  4.02  2.38 
n. of cases>2  15 16 16 16 16 11 15 12 
n. of cases 1÷2  1 0 0 0 0 5 1 4 
n. of cases 0.5÷1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n. of cases ≤ 0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5: Efficiency of mr criterion in the Italian simulated tax systems: “true” 
indexes are derived by MUL and MAJL criterions 
  V







mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e   |
MUL
mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e   |
MUL
mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e   |
MUL
mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e  
Max  30.73  38.79 21.64 39.13  2.35  8.78  2.91  5.67 
min  0.73  0.71 0.96 0.91 1.07 0.87 1.09 0.89 
geometric mean  12.84 15.24 7.68  12.41 1.45 2.74 1.80 3.05 
n. of cases>2  8  8 8 8 1 7 2 7 
n. of cases 1÷2  1  1 1 1 9 1 8 1 
n. of cases 0.5÷1  1  1 1 1 0 2 0 2 




Table 6: Efficiency of mr criterion in the Polish simulated tax systems: “true” 
indexes are derived by MUL and MAJL criterions 
  V







mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e   |
MUL
mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e   |
MUL
mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e   |
MUL
mr MUL e   |
MAJL
mr MAJL e  
Max  43.32 89.56 33.15 74.27 14.98 93.37  3.20  3.13 
min  0.93 1.02 1.20 0.84 0.93 0.76 0.83 0.77 
geometric mean  14.30  21.32  11.06  16.06 1.86 2.66 1.41 1.57 
n. of cases >2  12  12  13  12 5 7 3 4 
n. of cases 1÷2  2 4 3 2 8 5  10 8 
n. of cases 0.5÷1  2 0 0 2 3 4 3 4 





Two different approaches have been adopted in order to obtain different unequal 
treatment of equals and re-ranking. The ten tax structures applied to the Italian case 
consider rate schedules and the actual tax allowances and tax credits for items of 
expenditure as well as income related tax credits. On the contrary, the simulations 
performed on the Polish data set are based on four basic tax systems applied to real 
gross incomes, each disturbed by adding a random term, so that sixteen different tax 
structures have been considered. 
 
The tax structures hypothesized for Italy are the following: 
SYSTEM 1: Very progressive system with 21 brackets and tax rates ranging from 3 to 
85 per cent. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure are allowed. 
SYSTEM 2. A 20 per cent flat tax rate. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of 
expenditure are allowed. 
SYSTEM 3. System with three brackets and three tax rates (10, 30 and 50 per cent). 
Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure are allowed. 
SYSTEM 4. A 30 per cent tax rate. In addition to tax allowances and tax credits for 
items of expenditure, an income related tax credit of 1,000 euro is added. It is linearly 
decreasing with income and become zero above 100 thousand euro. 
SYSTEM 5. System equals to system 3 with an income related tax credit as in system 4. 
SYSTEM 6. System equals to system 2 with an income related tax credit of 500 euro. It 
is linearly decreasing with income and become zero above 50 thousand euro. 
SYSTEM 7. Progressive system with 9 brackets and tax rates ranging from 10 to 75 per 
cent. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of expenditure are allowed. 
SYSTEM 8. System equals to system 3 with an income related tax credit as in system 6. 
SYSTEM 9. System equals to system 7 with an income related tax credit as in system 6. 
SYSTEM 10. A 70 per cent tax rate. Only tax allowances and tax credits for items of 






The basic tax structures hypothesized for Poland are the following ones: 
BASIC SYSTEM 1. One 15 per cent tax rate is applied to all incomes, all tax payers 
benefit 556.02  PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 2. System with three income brackets: i) 19% from 0 to 44,490 PLN, 
ii) 30% from 44,490  to 85,528 PLN, all tax payers benefit 586.85 PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 3. System with two income brackets: i) 18% from 0 to 85,528 PLN, 
ii) 32% over 85,528 PLN; all income earners benefit 556.02 PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 4. System with four income brackets: i) 10% from 0 to 20.000 PLN, 
ii) 20% from 20,000 to 40,000 PLN, iii) 30% from 40,000 to 90,000 PLN, iv) 40% over 
90,000 PLN; all incomes benefit 500.00 PLN tax credit. 
 
Tax  i T  that results after the application of a tax system, is then modified by a 
random factor  i Z , so that net income becomes ( ) ii i i yT Z T − +⋅ .  i Z  is drawn from the 
uniform distributions (a)  () ~0 . 2 0 . 2 ZU −÷ , (b)  ( ) ~0 0 . 4 ZU ÷ , and from the normal 
distributions (c) ) 0133 . 0   ;   0 ( ~ N Z , (d) ) 12 . 0   ;   0 ( ~ N Z , so that each basic system 
generates four sub-systems. When the normal distribution is applied, the random factor 
i Z  is considered in absolute value; the programme did not allow incomes to become 
either negative or greater that 2yi.  
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